

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE DIVISION**

DEBRA MALONEY, Individually and on Behalf) Case No.: 17-cv-1238
of All Others Similarly Situated,)
Plaintiff,) **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**
v.)
EQUIFAX, INC.,)
Defendant.) **Jury Trial Demanded**

)

INTRODUCTION

1. This class action seeks redress for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 *et seq.*, and negligence.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claims arise under the laws of the United States.

3. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because (a) there are 100 or more Class members, (b) at least one Class member is a citizen of a state that is diverse from Defendant’s citizenship, and (c) the matter in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

4. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendant’s contacts with Wisconsin.

5. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claims emanated from activities within this District.

PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Debra Maloney is an individual who resides in the Eastern District of Wisconsin (Milwaukee County).

7. Defendant Equifax, Inc. (“Equifax”) is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business located at 1550 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309.

8. Equifax is a “consumer reporting agency” under 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) in that Equifax, by means of interstate commerce and for monetary fees, regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties

FACTS

9. Equifax is one of three nationwide credit-reporting companies that track and rate the financial history of U.S. consumers. The companies are supplied with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as information on everything from child support payments, credit limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer history. All this information and more factors into credit scores.

10. On September 7, 2017, Equifax publically reported a cybersecurity incident (“Data Breach”) potentially impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers. Equifax claims that based on its investigation, the unauthorized access occurred from mid-May through July 2017.

11. According to Equifax’s report, the breach was discovered on July 29th. The perpetrators gained access by “[exploiting] a [...] website application vulnerability” on one of the company’s U.S.-based servers. The hackers were then able to retrieve “certain files.”

12. Included among those files was extensive personal data: names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and in some instances, driver's license numbers. In addition, Equifax has admitted that credit card numbers for approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers as well as certain dispute documents with personal identifying information ("PII") for approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers were accessed.

13. Unlike other data breaches, not all of the people affected by the Equifax breach may be aware that they have a relationship with the company. Equifax gets its data from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders who report on the credit activity of individuals to credit reporting agencies, as well as by purchasing public records.

14. Personal data like this is a major score for cybercriminals who will likely look to capitalize on it by launching targeted phishing campaigns.

15. Plaintiff suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of her PII – a form of intangible property that was entrusted to Equifax, whether Plaintiffs like it or not, and that was compromised in and as a result of the Equifax Data Breach.

16. Additionally, Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the substantially increased risk of future fraud, identity theft, and misuse posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals who have already, or will imminently, misuse such information.

17. Moreover, Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that their private information, which remains in the possession of Equifax, is protected and safeguarded from future breaches.

18. At all relevant times, Equifax was well-aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the PII collected, maintained, and stored in the POS systems is highly sensitive,

susceptible to attack, and could be used for wrongful purposes by third parties, such as identity theft and fraud.

19. It is well known and the subject of many media reports that PII is highly coveted and a frequent target of hackers. Despite the frequent public announcements of data breaches of corporate entities, including Experian, Equifax maintained an insufficient and inadequate system to protect the PII of Plaintiff and Class members.

20. PII is a valuable commodity because it contains not only payment card numbers but PII as well. A “cyber blackmarket” exists in which criminals openly post stolen payment card numbers, social security numbers, and other personal information on a number of underground Internet websites. PII is “as good as gold” to identity thieves because they can use victims’ personal data to open new financial accounts and take out loans in another person’s name, incur charges on existing accounts, or clone ATM, debit, or credit cards.

21. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground alike recognize the value in PII contained in a merchant’s data systems; otherwise, they would not aggressively seek or pay for it. For example, in “one of 2013’s largest breaches . . . not only did hackers compromise the [card holder data] of three million customers, they also took registration data [containing PII] from 38 million users.” *See* Verizon 2014 PCI Compliance Report, available at: http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/industries/docs/retail/verizon_pci2014.pdf (hereafter “2014 Verizon Report”), at 54 (last visited April 10, 2017).

22. At all relevant times, Equifax knew, or reasonably should have known, of the importance of safeguarding PII and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur if its data security system was breached, including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on individuals as a result of a breach.

23. Equifax was, or should have been, fully aware of the significant number of people whose PII it collected, and thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by a breach of Equifax's systems.

24. Unfortunately, and as alleged below, despite all of this publicly available knowledge of the continued compromises of PII in the hands of other third parties, Equifax's approach to maintaining the privacy and security of the PII of Plaintiff and Class members was lackadaisical, cavalier, reckless, or at the very least, negligent.

25. The ramifications of Equifax's failure to keep Plaintiff and Class members' data secure are severe.

26. The FTC defines identity theft as "a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority." 17 C.F.R § 248.201 (2013).

27. The FTC describes "identifying information" as "any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person." *Id.*

28. Personal identifying information is a valuable commodity to identity thieves once the information has been compromised. As the FTC recognizes, once identity thieves have personal information, "they can drain your bank account, run up your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical treatment on your health insurance." Federal Trade Commission, *Warning Signs of Identity Theft*, available at: <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0271-warning-signs-identity-theft> (last visited April 10, 2017).

29. Javelin Strategy and Research reports that identity thieves have stolen \$112 billion in the past six years. See <https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2016-identity-fraud-fraudhits-inflection-point> (last visited April 10, 2017).

30. Identity thieves can use personal information, such as that of Plaintiff and Class members which Equifax failed to keep secure, to perpetrate a variety of crimes that harm victims. For instance, identity thieves may commit various types of government fraud such as: immigration fraud; obtaining a driver's license or identification card in the victim's name but with another's picture; using the victim's information to obtain government benefits; or filing a fraudulent tax return using the victim's information to obtain a fraudulent refund.

31. Reimbursing a consumer for a financial loss due to fraud does not make that individual whole again. On the contrary, identity theft victims must spend numerous hours and their own money repairing the impact to their credit. After conducting a study, the Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") found that identity theft victims "reported spending an average of about 7 hours clearing up the issues" and resolving the consequences of fraud in 2014. *See* Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 (Sept. 2015) available at: <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf> (last visited April 10, 2017).

32. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also between when PII or PCD is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.

See GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, at 29 (June 2007), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (last visited April 10, 2017).

33. Plaintiff and Class members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their PII.

34. The PII of Plaintiff and Class members is private and sensitive in nature and was left inadequately protected by Equifax. Equifax did not obtain Plaintiff and Class members' consent to disclose their PII to any other person as required by applicable law and industry standards.

35. The Equifax Data Breach was a direct and proximate result of Equifax's failure to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff and Class members' PII from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices, and the common law, including Equifax's failure to establish and implement appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff and Class members' PII to protect against reasonably foreseeable threats to the security or integrity of such information.

36. Equifax had the resources to prevent a breach, but neglected to adequately invest in data security, despite the growing number of well-publicized data breaches.

37. Had Equifax remedied the deficiencies in its data security systems, followed security guidelines, and adopted security measures recommended by experts in the field, Equifax would have prevented the Data Breach and, ultimately, the theft of its customers' PII.

38. Furthermore, Equifax executives sold at least \$1.8 million worth of shares before the public disclosure of the breach. It has been reported that its Chief Financial Officer John Gamble sold shares worth \$946,374, its president of U.S. information solutions, Joseph Loughran, exercised options to dispose of stock worth \$584,099, and its president of workforce solutions, Rodolfo Ploder, sold \$250,458 of stock on August 2, 2017.

39. As a direct and proximate result of Equifax's wrongful actions and inaction and the resulting Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members have been placed at an imminent,

immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm from identity theft and identity fraud, requiring them to take the time which they otherwise would have dedicated to other life demands such as work and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives including, *inter alia*, by placing “freezes” and “alerts” with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity, and filing police reports. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured. In all manners of life in this country, time has constantly been recognized as compensable, for many consumers it is the way they are compensated, and even if retired from the work force, consumers should be free of having to deal with the consequences of a credit reporting agency’s slippage, as is the case here.

40. Equifax’s wrongful actions and inaction directly and proximately caused the theft and dissemination into the public domain of Plaintiff and Class members’ PII, causing them to suffer, and continue to suffer, economic damages and other actual harm for which they are entitled to compensation, including:

- a. Theft of their personal and financial information;
- b. Unauthorized charges on their debit and credit card accounts;
- c. The imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential fraud and identity theft posed by their PII being placed in the hands of criminals and already misused via the sale of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ information on the black market;
- d. The untimely and inadequate notification of the Data Breach;
- e. The improper disclosure of their PII;
- f. Loss of privacy;

- g. Ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data Breach;
- h. Ascertainable losses in the form of deprivation of the value of their PII and PCD, for which there is a well-established national and international market;
- i. Ascertainable losses in the form of the loss of cash back or other benefits as a result of their inability to use certain accounts and cards affected by the Data Breach;
- j. Loss of use of and access to their account funds and costs associated with the inability to obtain money from their accounts or being limited in the amount of money they were permitted to obtain from their accounts, including missed payments on bills and loans, late charges and fees, and adverse effects on their credit including adverse credit notations; and,
- k. The loss of productivity and value of their time spent to address, attempt to ameliorate, mitigate, and deal with the actual and future consequences of the data breach, including finding fraudulent charges, cancelling and reissuing cards, purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft protection services, imposition of withdrawal and purchase limits on compromised accounts, and the stress, nuisance and annoyance of dealing with all such issues resulting from the Data Breach.

41. Equifax has not offered customers any meaningful credit monitoring or identity theft protection services, despite the fact that it is well known and acknowledged by the government that damage and fraud from a data breach can take years to occur. As a result, Plaintiff and Class members are left to their own actions to protect themselves from the financial

damage Equifax has allowed to occur. The additional cost of adequate and appropriate coverage, or insurance, against the losses and exposure that Equifax's actions have created for Plaintiff and Class members, is ascertainable and is a determination appropriate for the trier of fact. Equifax has also not offered to cover any of the damages sustained by Plaintiff or Class members.

42. While the PII of Plaintiff and members of the Class has been stolen, Equifax continues to hold PII of consumers, including Plaintiff and Class members. Particularly because Equifax has demonstrated an inability to prevent a breach or stop it from continuing even after being detected, Plaintiff and members of the Class have an undeniably interest in insuring that their PII is secure, remains secure, is properly and promptly destroyed and is not subject to further theft.

COUNT I – WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE FCRA

43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

44. As individuals, Plaintiff and Class members are consumers entitled to the protections of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c).

45. As a consumer reporting agency, the FCRA requires Equifax to “maintain reasonable procedures designed to . . . limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 1681b of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).

46. Under the FCRA, a “consumer report” is defined as “any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for -- (A)

credit . . . to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; . . . or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). The compromised data was a consumer report under the FCRA because it was a communication of information bearing on Class members’ credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living used, or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part, for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the Class members’ eligibility for credit.

47. As a consumer reporting agency, Equifax may only furnish a consumer report under the limited circumstances set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, “and no other.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). None of the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b permit credit reporting agencies to furnish consumer reports to unauthorized or unknown entities, or computer hackers such as those who accessed the Class members’ PII. Equifax violated § 1681b by furnishing consumer reports to unauthorized or unknown entities or computer hackers, as detailed above.

48. Equifax furnished the Class members’ consumer reports by disclosing their consumer reports to unauthorized entities and computer hackers; allowing unauthorized entities and computer hackers to access their consumer reports; knowingly and/or recklessly failing to take security measures that would prevent unauthorized entities or computer hackers from accessing their consumer reports; and/or failing to take reasonable security measures that would prevent unauthorized entities or computer hackers from accessing their consumer reports.

49. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has pursued enforcement actions against consumer reporting agencies under the FCRA for failing to “take adequate measures to fulfill their obligations to protect information contained in consumer reports, as required by the” FCRA, in connection with data breaches.

50. Equifax willfully and/or recklessly violated § 1681b and § 1681e(a) by providing impermissible access to consumer reports and by failing to maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes outlined under section 1681b of the FCRA. The willful and reckless nature of Equifax's violations is supported by, among other things, former employees' admissions that Equifax's data security practices have deteriorated in recent years, and Equifax's numerous other data breaches in the past. Further, Equifax touts itself as an industry leader in breach prevention; thus, Equifax was well aware of the importance of the measures organizations should take to prevent data breaches, and willingly failed to take them.

51. Equifax also acted willfully and recklessly because it knew or should have known about its legal obligations regarding data security and data breaches under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission. *See, e.g.*, 55 Fed. Reg. 18804 (May 4, 1990), 1990 Commentary On The Fair Credit Reporting Act. 16 C.F.R. Part 600, Appendix To Part 600, Sec. 607 2E. Equifax obtained or had available these and other substantial written materials that apprised them of their duties under the FCRA. Any reasonable consumer reporting agency knows or should know about these requirements. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Equifax acted consciously in breaching known duties regarding data security and data breaches and depriving Plaintiff and other members of the Class of their rights under the FCRA.

52. Equifax's willful and/or reckless conduct provided a means for unauthorized intruders to obtain and misuse Plaintiff's and Class members' personal information for no permissible purposes under the FCRA.

53. Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged by Equifax's willful or reckless failure to comply with the FCRA. Therefore, Plaintiff and each of the Class members are entitled to recover "any actual damages sustained by the consumer . . . or damages of not less than \$100 and not more than \$1,000." 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).

54. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to punitive damages, costs of the action, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2)& (3).

COUNT II – NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE FCRA

55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

56. Equifax was negligent in failing to maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes outlined under section 1681b of the FCRA. Equifax's negligent failure to maintain reasonable procedures is supported by, among other things, former employees' admissions that Equifax's data security practices have deteriorated in recent years, and Equifax's numerous other data breaches in the past. Further, as an enterprise claiming to be an industry leader in data breach prevention, Equifax was well aware of the importance of the measures organizations should take to prevent data breaches, yet failed to take them.

57. Equifax's negligent conduct provided a means for unauthorized intruders to obtain Plaintiff's and the Class members' PII and consumer reports for no permissible purposes under the FCRA.

58. Plaintiff and the Class member have been damaged by Equifax's negligent failure to comply with the FCRA. Therefore, Plaintiff and each of the Class member are entitled to recover "any actual damages sustained by the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1).

59. Plaintiff and the Class member are also entitled to recover their costs of the action, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(2).

COUNT III – NEGLIGENCE

60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

61. Upon accepting and storing the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members in its computer systems and on its networks, Equifax undertook and owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to exercise reasonable care to secure and safeguard that information and to use commercially reasonable methods to do so. Equifax knew that the PII was private and confidential and should be protected as private and confidential.

62. Equifax owed a duty of care not to subject Plaintiff, along with their PII, and Class members to an unreasonable risk of harm because they were foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate security practices.

63. Equifax owed numerous duties to Plaintiff and to members of the Class, including the following:

- a. To exercise reasonable care in obtaining, retaining, securing, safeguarding, deleting and protecting PII in its possession;
- b. To protect PII using reasonable and adequate security procedures and systems that are compliant with industry-standard practices; and
- c. To implement processes to quickly detect a data breach and to timely act on warnings about data breaches.

64. Equifax also breached its duty to Plaintiff and the Class Members to adequately protect and safeguard PII by knowingly disregarding standard information security principles,

despite obvious risks, and by allowing unmonitored and unrestricted access to unsecured PII. Furthering their dilatory practices, Equifax failed to provide adequate supervision and oversight of the PII with which they were and are entrusted, in spite of the known risk and foreseeable likelihood of breach and misuse, which permitted an unknown third party to gather PII of Plaintiff and Class Members, misuse the PII and intentionally disclose it to others without consent.

65. Equifax knew, or should have known, of the risks inherent in collecting and storing PII, the vulnerabilities of its data security systems, and the importance of adequate security. Equifax knew about numerous, well-publicized data breaches, including the breach at Experian.

66. Equifax knew, or should have known, that their data systems and networks did not adequately safeguard Plaintiff and Class Members' PII.

67. Equifax breached its duties to Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard PII of Plaintiff and Class Members.

68. Because Equifax knew that a breach of its systems would damage millions of individuals, including Plaintiff and Class members, Equifax had a duty to adequately protect their data systems and the PII contained thereon.

69. Equifax had a special relationship with Plaintiff and Class members. Plaintiff's and Class members' willingness to entrust Equifax with their PII was predicated on the understanding that Equifax would take adequate security precautions. Moreover, only Equifax had the ability to protect its systems and the PII it stored on them from attack.

70. Equifax's own conduct also created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and Class members and their PII. Equifax's misconduct included failing to: (1) secure its systems, despite knowing their vulnerabilities, (2) comply with industry standard security practices, (3) implement adequate system and event monitoring, and (4) implement the systems, policies, and procedures necessary to prevent this type of data breach.

71. Equifax also had independent duties under state and federal laws that required Equifax to reasonably safeguard Plaintiff's and Class members' Personal Information and promptly notify them about the data breach.

72. Equifax breached its duties to Plaintiff and Class members in numerous ways, including:

- d. By failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard PII of Plaintiff and Class members;
- e. By creating a foreseeable risk of harm through the misconduct previously described;
- f. By failing to implement adequate security systems, protocols and practices sufficient to protect Plaintiff's and Class members' PII both before and after learning of the Data Breach;
- g. By failing to comply with the minimum industry data security standards during the period of the Data Breach; and
- h. By failing to timely and accurately disclose that Plaintiff's and Class members' PII had been improperly acquired or accessed.

73. Through Equifax's acts and omissions described in this Complaint, including Equifax's failure to provide adequate security and its failure to protect PII of Plaintiff and Class

members from being foreseeably captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen and misused, Equifax unlawfully breached its duty to use reasonable care to adequately protect and secure PII of Plaintiff and Class members during the time it was within Equifax possession or control.

74. The law further imposes an affirmative duty on Equifax to timely disclose the unauthorized access and theft of the PII to Plaintiff and the Class so that Plaintiff and Class members can take appropriate measures to mitigate damages, protect against adverse consequences, and thwart future misuse of their PII.

75. Equifax breached its duty to notify Plaintiff and Class Members of the unauthorized access by waiting many months after learning of the breach to notify Plaintiff and Class Members and then by failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members information regarding the breach until September 2017. Instead, its executives disposed of at least \$1.8 million worth of shares in the company after Equifax learned of the data breach but before it was publicly announced. To date, Equifax has not provided sufficient information to Plaintiff and Class Members regarding the extent of the unauthorized access and continues to breach its disclosure obligations to Plaintiff and the Class.

76. Through Equifax's acts and omissions described in this Complaint, including Equifax's failure to provide adequate security and its failure to protect PII of Plaintiff and Class Members from being foreseeably captured, accessed, disseminated, stolen, and misused, Equifax unlawfully breached its duty to use reasonable care to adequately protect and secure PII of Plaintiff and Class members during the time it was within Equifax's possession or control.

77. Further, through its failure to provide timely and clear notification of the Data Breach to consumers, Equifax prevented Plaintiff and Class Members from taking meaningful, proactive steps to secure their financial data and bank accounts.

78. Upon information and belief, Equifax improperly and inadequately safeguarded PII of Plaintiff and Class Members in deviation of standard industry rules, regulations, and practices at the time of the unauthorized access. Equifax's failure to take proper security measures to protect sensitive PII of Plaintiff and Class members as described in this Complaint, created conditions conducive to a foreseeable, intentional criminal act, namely the unauthorized access of PII of Plaintiff and Class members.

79. Equifax's conduct was grossly negligent and departed from all reasonable standards of care, including, but not limited to: failing to adequately protect the PII; failing to conduct regular security audits; failing to provide adequate and appropriate supervision of persons having access to PII of Plaintiff and Class members; and failing to provide Plaintiff and Class members with timely and sufficient notice that their sensitive PII had been compromised.

80. Neither Plaintiff nor the other Class members contributed to the Data Breach and subsequent misuse of their PII as described in this Complaint.

81. As a direct and proximate cause of Equifax's conduct, Plaintiff and the Class suffered damages including, but not limited to: damages arising from the unauthorized charges on their debit or credit cards or on cards that were fraudulently obtained through the use of the PII of Plaintiff and Class Members; damages arising from Plaintiff's inability to use their debit or credit cards because those cards were cancelled, suspended, or otherwise rendered unusable as a result of the Data Breach and/or false or fraudulent charges stemming from the Data Breach, including but not limited to late fees charges and foregone cash back rewards; damages from lost time and effort to mitigate the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives including, inter alia, by placing "freezes" and "alerts" with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial accounts, closely reviewing and

monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized activity, and filing police reports and damages from identity theft, which may take months if not years to discover and detect, given the far-reaching, adverse and detrimental consequences of identity theft and loss of privacy. The nature of other forms of economic damage and injury may take years to detect, and the potential scope can only be assessed after a thorough investigation of the facts and events surrounding the theft mentioned above.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

82. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons, (b) whose personally identifiable information was acquired by unauthorized persons, (c) in the data breach announced by Equifax in September 2017.

83. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, there are more than 10 million class members based on the estimated 143 million individuals whose PII was compromised in the Equifax Data Breach nationwide.

84. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common questions include:

- a. Whether Equifax had a duty to protect PII;
- b. Whether Equifax knew or should have known of the susceptibility of their data security systems to a data breach;
- c. Whether Equifax's security measures to protect their systems were reasonable in light of the measures recommended by data security experts;
- d. Whether Equifax was negligent in failing to implement reasonable and adequate security procedures and practices;

- e. Whether Equifax's failure to implement adequate data security measures allowed the breach to occur;
- f. Whether Equifax's conduct, including their failure to act, resulted in or was the proximate cause of the breach of its systems, resulting in the loss of the PII of Plaintiff and Class members;
- g. Whether Plaintiff and Class members were injured and suffered damages or other acceptable losses because of Equifax's failure to reasonably protect its POS systems and data network; and,
- h. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to relief.

85. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories.

86. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases.

87. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

JURY DEMAND

88. Plaintiff hereby demand a trial by jury.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the Class and against Defendant for:

- (a) actual damages;
- (b) statutory damages;
- (c) punitive damages;

- (d) injunctive relief;
- (e) attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; and
- (f) such other or further relief as the Court deems proper.

Dated: September 12, 2017

ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP

By: /s/ John D. Blythin
Shpetim Ademi (SBN 1026973)
John D. Blythin (SBN 1046105)
Mark A. Eldridge (SBN 1089944)
3620 East Layton Avenue
Cudahy, WI 53110
(414) 482-8000
(414) 482-8001 (fax)
sademi@ademilaw.com
jblythin@ademilaw.com
meldridge@ademilaw.com